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- Title
Epistemic obligations and free speech.
- Authors
Millar, Boyd
- Abstract
Philosophical discussions of free speech often focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause. However, in addition to our moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn't harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, the existing psychological evidence suggests that human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Taken together, these facts suggest that there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: Because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation.
- Subjects
FREEDOM of speech; DUTY; FALSE claims; HARM (Ethics); HUMAN beings; OBLIGATIONS (Law)
- Publication
Analytic Philosophy, 2024, Vol 65, Issue 2, p203
- ISSN
2153-9596
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phib.12279