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- Title
AGENCY CONFLICT AND THE END OF STRATEGIC PATIENCE.
- Authors
Kim, Inhan
- Abstract
With the end of the second Obama administration, strategic patience towards North Korean nuclear programs came under fire. Pyongyang has strengthened its nuclear capabilities with multiple tests and, to the dismay of Washington, Beijing has shied away from pressing Pyongyang to denuclearize. Drawing on principal-agent theory, this study aims at understanding the critical shortcomings of strategic patience. A principal delegates authority to an agent in the hope that the agent will solve a problem more efficiently and effectively with its expertise. However, the initial delegation of power and authority inherently offers the agent room to pursue its own interest and behave opportunistically. Parsing out the divergence of interests between Beijing and Washington in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities and examining four United Nations-sponsored sanctions, this paper argues that China's vested strategic and economic interests in North Korea have left Beijing opposed to strict design and implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang.
- Subjects
PYONGYANG (Korea); STRATEGIC alliances (Business); INTERNATIONAL relations; NUCLEAR-weapon-free zones; INTERNATIONAL conflict; ECONOMIC history
- Publication
Journal of East Asian Affairs, 2017, Vol 31, Issue 2, p63
- ISSN
1010-1608
- Publication type
Article