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- Title
Lesser-Evil Justifications: A Reply to Frowe.
- Authors
Gordon-Solmon, Kerah; Pummer, Theron
- Abstract
Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents' permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act on their lesser-evil justifications. Our primary task is to refute Frowe's flagship argument. Secondarily, it is to sketch a positive case for nonconsequentialist orthodoxy.
- Subjects
LEGAL justification; HUMAN rights; FROWE, Helen; ARGUMENT; CONSEQUENTIALISM (Ethics)
- Publication
Law & Philosophy, 2022, Vol 41, Issue 5, p639
- ISSN
0167-5249
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10982-022-09454-w