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- Title
Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief.
- Authors
WILLIAMS, JOHN N.
- Abstract
In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective-interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore-paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches.
- Subjects
PARADOX; INTERPRETATION (Philosophy); BELIEF &; doubt; ASSERTIONS (Logic); REASON; JUSTIFICATION (Theory of knowledge); CONSCIOUSNESS; MOORE, G. E., 1873-1958
- Publication
Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 2010, Vol 76, Issue 3, p221
- ISSN
0040-5825
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x