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- Title
Elites, Rents, and Transitions: A New Institutionalist View of Ethiopia's Political Development<sup> 1 </sup>.
- Authors
Demerew, Kaleb
- Abstract
The violence trap theory stipulates that rent-based, closed-access orders impede development, whereas open-access orders make development possible. Transition toward an open-access order occurs gradually through standardizing elite privileges, legal perpetuity mechanisms, and political-military consolidation. Using this framework, this article identifies important variables that are missing from prevailing narratives of political development in African states. Accordingly, within-case analysis of Ethiopia's recent political transitions reveals progressive development transitions under Emperor Haile Selassie and regression toward a fragile state after the 1974 revolution. With the revolution of 1991, a new regime reconsolidated the state but maintained a closed-access order, excluding competing elites by monopolizing rents through ethnic patronage. The legacies of these transitions may illuminate institutional mechanisms impeding development in present-day Ethiopia. With this line of inquiry, this article establishes a framework for analyzing institutional development impediments in contemporary African states.
- Subjects
ETHIOPIA; POLITICAL development; ELITE (Social sciences); RENT; HAILE Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, 1892-1975; REGRESSION (Civilization); ETHIOPIAN Revolution of 1974
- Publication
Africa Today, 2022, Vol 68, Issue 3, p65
- ISSN
0001-9887
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2979/africatoday.68.3.04