We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Contentless basic minds and perceptual knowledge.
- Authors
Rolla, Giovanni
- Abstract
Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information acquired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and assuming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional epistemological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge.
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge; COGNITION; PLURALISM; SENSORY perception; THEORY of constraints
- Publication
Filosofia UNISINOS, 2017, Vol 18, Issue 1, p47
- ISSN
1519-5023
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.4013/fsu.2017.181.06