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- Title
CENTRALIZING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION.
- Authors
KUMAR, SAPNA
- Abstract
The United States has a mostly decentralized system for promoting Flew medicine development. By offering patents and regulatory exclusivities, the government incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to invent and bring to market new medicines. Although this development model offers benefits for promoting innovation, it comes at a cost: Market-based incentives lead companies to prioritize research and development ("R&D") for medicines that offer a safe path to profitability, as opposed to those that offer the greatest social benefit. In particular, pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to invest in R&D for critically-needed antibiotics and infectious disease vaccines-both of which are difficult to develop and provide uncertain financial returns. This Article proposes that the government oversee the development of needed "infrastructure-adjacent medicines"-- medicines that can help prevent future collapses of the public healthcare system and mitigate major economic harm. In addition to boosting internal R&D in such critical areas, the government could directly support innovation by exclusively licensing promising drug candidates from small- to mid-sized entities or by purchasing small biotechnology companies on the open market. When suitable private partners are not available, the government could oversee the final stages of development and retain control over the resulting intellectual property rights. This approach would allow private-sector pharmaceutical development to continue to flourish while filling a critical public health gap.
- Subjects
DRUG development; PHARMACEUTICAL research; PROFITABILITY; PHARMACEUTICAL industry; ANTIBIOTICS; COMMUNICABLE diseases; VACCINES; INTELLECTUAL property
- Publication
Maryland Law Review, 2024, Vol 83, Issue 3, p653
- ISSN
0025-4282
- Publication type
Article