We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
DOES LIMITED PUNISHMENT LIMIT THE SCOPE FOR CROSS RETALIATION?
- Authors
Chisik, Richard; Onder, Harun
- Abstract
This paper analyzes two prominent institutional rules in the international trading system: a limited cross-retaliation rule characterized by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( DSU) Article 22.3 and a limited punishment rule characterized by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT) Article XXVIII. In general, both rules are designed to limit the countermeasures upon a violation; however, the former rule specifies the limits of composition in retaliation, whereas the latter one designates the limits of retaliation magnitude. We show that, albeit seemingly unrelated, the limited cross-retaliation rule complements the limited punishment rule in permitting greater trade liberalization. Specifically, we show how the limited cross-retaliation rule also helps limit the incentives to violate the trade agreement when the limited punishment rule prevails. ( JEL F13, K33, C73)
- Subjects
CONFLICT management; GENERAL Agreement on Tariffs &; Trade (Organization); FREE trade; AGREEMENT on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994); WORLD Trade Organization
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2017, Vol 55, Issue 3, p1213
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.12431