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- Title
Vida mental sin conceptos y cognición animal en Kant.
- Authors
Stepanenko Gutiérrez, Pedro
- Abstract
According to a conceptualist interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy the use of concepts is a necessary condition for perception. A frequent objection of the Kantian non-conceptualists against this idea points out that Kant accepted perceptions without concepts because he denied that non-human animals have concepts. This paper aims to answer that objection by showing that for Kant the mental life of non-human animals, that is, a mental life without concepts, is only a natural mechanism by which behavioral responses are related to stimuli like sensations, where no representations of objects take place stricto sensu.
- Subjects
PERCEPTION in animals; CONCEPTUALISM
- Publication
Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, 2023, Issue 17, p17
- ISSN
2386-7655
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5209/kant.88693