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- Title
Thought Experiments and The Pragmatic Nature of Explanation.
- Authors
Karadimas, Panagiotis
- Abstract
Different why-questions emerge under different contexts and require different information in order to be addressed. Hence a relevance relation can hardly be invariant across contexts. However, what is indeed common under any possible context is that all explananda require scientific information in order to be explained. So no scientific information is in principle explanatorily irrelevant, it only becomes so under certain contexts. In view of this, scientific thought experiments can offer explanations, should we analyze their representational strategies. Their representations involve empirical as well as hypothetical statements. I call this the "representational mingling" which bears scientific information that can explain events. Buchanan's thought experiment from constitutional economics is examined to show how mingled representations explain.
- Subjects
THOUGHT experiments; EXPLANATION
- Publication
Foundations of Science, 2024, Vol 29, Issue 2, p257
- ISSN
1233-1821
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10699-022-09844-2