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- Title
A MODEL OF DECLINING STANDARDS[*].
- Authors
Sobel, Joel
- Abstract
This paper presents a model in which relative standing determines standards. There are three kinds of agents in the model: candidates who wish to pass a test, members of the elite who have passed the test, and the judge who decides who passes. In order to pass, a candidate's performance must be at least as good as the performance of a representative member of the elite. Without perturbations in the underlying data, the model predicts that standards will not change. Perturbations in the preferences used to judge candidates lead to a reduction in standards.
- Subjects
STANDARDS; EMPLOYEE promotions; PREFERENCES (Philosophy)
- Publication
International Economic Review, 2000, Vol 41, Issue 2, p295
- ISSN
0020-6598
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/1468-2354.00065