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- Title
Essential equilibria of large generalized games.
- Authors
Correa, Sofía; Torres-Martínez, Juan
- Abstract
We characterize the essential stability of games with a continuum of players, where strategy profiles may affect objective functions and admissible strategies. Taking into account the perturbations defined by a continuous mapping from a complete metric space of parameters to the space of continuous games, we prove that essential stability is a generic property and every game has a stable subset of equilibria. These results are extended to discontinuous large generalized games assuming that only payoff functions are subject to perturbations. We apply our results in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria, where the unique essential equilibrium is that only politically engaged players participate in the electoral process. In addition, employing our results for discontinuous games, we determine the stability properties of competitive prices in large economies.
- Subjects
GAME theory; PERTURBATION theory; PARAMETER estimation; NASH equilibrium; STRATEGIC planning
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2014, Vol 57, Issue 3, p479
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-014-0821-3