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- Title
Antidumping protection and R&D competition.
- Authors
Xiwang Gao; Kaz Miyagiwa
- Abstract
In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade. JEL classification: F12, F13
- Subjects
DUMPING (International trade); INVESTMENTS; INTERNATIONAL trade; COMMERCIAL policy; FREE ports &; zones; FREE trade; TERMS of trade
- Publication
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005, Vol 38, Issue 1, p211
- ISSN
0008-4085
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00276.x