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- Title
Glass Ceilings or Sticky Floors? Statistical Discrimination in a Dynamic Model of Hiring and Promotion.
- Authors
Bjerk, David
- Abstract
I show that when two groups differ in ( i) their average skill level, ( ii) the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, and/or ( iii) the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker's skill over time, equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy, even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs.
- Subjects
UNITED States; LABOR market; EMPLOYMENT discrimination; BUSINESS enterprises; UNITED States. Federal Glass Ceiling Commission; EMPLOYEE promotions; CAREER development
- Publication
Economic Journal, 2008, Vol 118, Issue 530, p961
- ISSN
0013-0133
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02157.x