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- Title
The power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation.
- Authors
Harrington Jr., Joseph E.
- Abstract
In a distributive setting, this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous. It is found, not surprisingly, that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage. What is surprising is the degree of this advantage. We find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 - a for an a-majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members. The voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process.
- Subjects
VOTING; POLITICAL participation; PRACTICAL politics; DECISION making; SOCIAL choice
- Publication
Public Choice, 1990, Vol 64, Issue 1, p1
- ISSN
0048-5829
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF00125914