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- Title
Preference densities and social choices.
- Authors
Richter, Marcel; Wong, Kam-Chau
- Abstract
We discuss a ranking method that allows social pairwise rankings of alternatives to depend on more than just individuals’ pairwise rankings. This violates Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, but allows Borda’s rank-order counting, which provides a limited accounting for individual preference intensities. We capture Arrow’s rules (i.e., with IIA) and Borda’s method as two polar cases, and allow cases in between. Our main result provides the critical line dividing those degrees of intensity, or preference density, that yield positive results from those that yield negative results.
- Subjects
SOCIAL choice; DECISION making; WELFARE economics; SOCIAL psychology; CHOICE (Psychology); PARETO optimum
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2008, Vol 36, Issue 2, p225
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-007-0271-2