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- Title
Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term...
- Authors
Besley, Timothy; Case, Anne
- Abstract
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.
- Subjects
UNITED States; GUBERNATORIAL elections; POLITICAL psychology; ECONOMIC policy; UNITED States governors; POLITICAL campaigns; ELECTIONS
- Publication
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, Vol 110, Issue 3, p769
- ISSN
0033-5533
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/2946699