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- Title
Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting.
- Authors
Snyder Jr., James M.; Ting, Michael M.; Ansolabehere, Stephen
- Abstract
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
- Subjects
ORGANIZATION; GAME theory; MATHEMATICAL models; COLLECTIVE bargaining; VOTING; COALITION governments
- Publication
American Economic Review, 2005, Vol 95, Issue 4, p981
- ISSN
0002-8282
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1257/0002828054825538