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- Title
The Identity Objection to the future‐like‐ours argument.
- Authors
Brill, Skott
- Abstract
Some critics of Don Marquis's 'future‐like‐ours' anti‐abortion argument launch what has been called the Identity Objection. The upshot of this objection is that under a psychological theory of personal identity, a non‐sentient fetus lacks precisely what Marquis believes gives it a right to life – a future like ours. However, Eric Vogelstein, in a recent article, has argued that under this theory of personal identity a non‐sentient fetus, in fact, has a future like ours, which he believes dissolves the Identity Objection. But Vogelstein is mistaken. Even if he is correct that there is a sense in which a non‐sentient fetus has a future of value under a psychological theory of personal identity, the sense in which it has one is importantly different from the sense in which we have one, meaning that, under such a theory, a non‐sentient fetus does not have a future like ours.
- Subjects
IDENTITY (Philosophical concept); ABORTION &; ethics; MARQUIS, Don; FUTURE, The; FETUS; IDENTITY (Psychology)
- Publication
Bioethics, 2019, Vol 33, Issue 2, p287
- ISSN
0269-9702
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/bioe.12546