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- Title
The Shape of the Kantian Mind.
- Abstract
Kant's readers have disagreed about whether, according to his account of cognition, concepts, representations of the understanding, are involved in intuitions, representations of sensibility. But proponents of the affirmative 'conceptualist' answer and those of the negative 'non‐conceptualist' answer have alike presupposed that such involvement should be construed in a particular way: i.e., as the involvement of particular concepts in particular exercises of sensibility. I argue, on the contrary, that it should not be: that though, for Kant, no concepts are applied in exercises of sensibility, nonetheless the understanding, the faculty of concepts, is teleologically internal to sensibility and, therefore, to its exercises. That is, those exercises are per se directed towards the provision to the understanding of objects to which its fundamental concepts, the categories, are applicable, though no act of categorical application is internal to them. This conception of sensibility, available only in light of a careful distinction between capacities and acts, is demanded, I argue, by Kant's conception of a priori knowledge as elaborated in his Transcendental Deduction.
- Subjects
COGNITION; SENSITIVITY (Personality trait); CONCEPTUALISM; INTUITION; PHILOSOPHY of mind
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2022, Vol 104, Issue 2, p364
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phpr.12767