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- Title
Confusion and explanation.
- Authors
Goodman, Rachel
- Abstract
In Talking about, Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a "belief model" of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows.
- Subjects
EXPLANATION; ARGUMENT; PUZZLES
- Publication
Mind & Language, 2024, Vol 39, Issue 3, p434
- ISSN
0268-1064
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/mila.12510