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- Title
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.
- Authors
Way, Jonathan
- Abstract
Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.
- Subjects
REASONING; EPISTEMICS; OBJECTIVISM (Philosophy); THEORY of knowledge; RATIONALISM
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2021, Vol 178, Issue 10, p3177
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-020-01575-z