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- Title
CHINA'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY AGAINST THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION CARBON TAX SCHEME: A TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL ANALYSIS.
- Authors
Qiao Han; Nan Song; Bo Lu; Guowei Hua; Du, Helen S.
- Abstract
A two-stage game model is proposed in this paper to study how China can best respond to the European Union (EU) Aviation Carbon Tax Scheme. Four possible strategies of China can be chosen, including "non-resistance", "refusal of pay", "retaliatory duties" and "credible threat". The analytic result shows that the strategy "refusal of pay" makes a consensus with the Chinese policy as an optimal strategy for China. The main contribution of this paper is to study a heated divergence on aviation carbon tax by using a two-stage game model.
- Subjects
EUROPEAN Union; CARBON taxes; AVIATION policy; GAME theory in economics; CHINESE economic policy
- Publication
Environmental Engineering & Management Journal (EEMJ), 2015, Vol 14, Issue 8, p1803
- ISSN
1582-9596
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.30638/eemj.2015.192