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- Title
Is There a Hold-up Problem?
- Authors
Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus
- Abstract
We report on a hold-up experiment in which unilateral investment is followed by bilateral bargaining according to Nash’s demand game. Without communication, investment is low and coordination is poor. Unilateral communication facilitates coordination, but not perfectly. Successful coordination predominantly entails“fair” outcomes. Perhaps surprisingly, sellers(investors) do at least as well under buyer communication as under seller communication.
- Subjects
COLLECTIVE bargaining; INVESTMENTS; PURCHASING agents; INVESTORS; BUSINESS communication; MARKETING strategy
- Publication
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004, Vol 106, Issue 3, p475
- ISSN
0347-0520
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00373.x