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- Title
Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.
- Authors
Cowan, Robert
- Abstract
Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can (and do) sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory – Neo-Sentimentalism – according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHICAL research; LEGAL justification; CRIMINAL law; ETHICAL intuitionism; ETHICS; SENSORY perception
- Publication
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2016, Vol 46, Issue 1, p59
- ISSN
0045-5091
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1080/00455091.2015.1123037