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- Title
Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets.
- Authors
SANGMOK LEE
- Abstract
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent of overall stable matchings. In one-to-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mechanism does not exceed the gap between utilities from the best and worst stable partners. Thus, most agents in a large market would not have significant incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms. The incentive compatibility extends to many-to-one matching when agents employ truncation strategies and capacity manipulations in a Gale-Shapley mechanism.
- Subjects
LABOR incentives; NATIONAL Resident Matching Program (U.S.); RANDOM graphs; BIPARTITE graphs; ECONOMIC equilibrium
- Publication
Review of Economic Studies, 2017, Vol 84, Issue 1, p444
- ISSN
0034-6527
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/restud/rdw041