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- Title
Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains.
- Authors
Ohseto, Shinji
- Abstract
We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two characterizations of strategy-proof and decision-efficient mechanisms that satisfy a stronger version of egalitarian-equivalence on preference domains bounded above. These characterizations tell us a trade-off between strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, and a relationship with strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Finally, we prove that no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is Nash implementable even on extremely restricted preference domains.
- Subjects
RESOURCE allocation; CONSUMER goods; MONETARY incentives; PARETO optimum; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2004, Vol 23, Issue 3, p659
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-003-0369-0