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- Title
Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money.
- Authors
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo
- Abstract
Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions - neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization - the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed price equilibrium with a well-defined rationing method (Gale's top-trading cycle procedure).
- Subjects
HOUSING market; HOUSING finance; HOUSING development; MONEY; RATIONING; RESOURCE allocation
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2002, Vol 20, Issue 3, p483
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s001990100232