We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core.
- Authors
Serfes, Konstantinos
- Abstract
Summary. We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically, i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. The results we obtain serve as an extension to the results in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) in a setting where agents behave non-myopically. In particular, we examine the following two questions: 1) If we have a sequence of allocations that am in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy? 2) Given a non-myopic corn allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation?
- Subjects
ECONOMICS; MARKOV processes; ECONOMIC equilibrium
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2001, Vol 18, Issue 2, p333
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/PL00004187