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- Title
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon.
- Authors
Madison, B.
- Abstract
In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist's account of the intuitions underlying the New Evil Genius thought experiment is incomplete at best. Therefore, as presented, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains.
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge; VISUAL perception; JUSTIFICATION (Ethics); EXTERNALISM (Philosophy of mind); EPISTEMIC logic; REVISIONISM (Christian theology); DIALECT literature
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2014, Vol 29, Issue 1, p61
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-013-0194-4