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- Title
A different paradigm for expert systems: an introduction to logic programming and related knowledge representation issues.
- Authors
Jones, James D.
- Abstract
Current expert system technology is 30 years old. Expert system shells find their origins in the work of early expert systems, most notably MYCIN which was developed at Stanford in the mid-1970s. Even Prolog programmers are settling for less robust reasoning power. The logic programming community (from which both expert systems and Prolog arose) has made notable advances since those times. These advances are lacking from current expert system technology. The advances include a well-developed theory of multiple forms of negation, an understanding of open domains and the closed world assumption, default reasoning with exceptions, reasoning with respect to time (i.e. a solution to the frame problem, and introspection with regard to previous beliefs), reasoning about actions, introspection, and maintaining multiple views of the world simultaneously. The contribution of this paper is to discuss these developments in a singular, integrated, practical, digestible manner. Some of these ideas exist in a variety of papers spread across decades. They also exist in the minds of a very small community of researchers. Some of these ideas are unpublished. The presentation in this paper is from a different point of view, and intended to be more comprehensive and pedagogical. The presentation is also intended to be accessible to a much wider audience. Both the synthesis and the simplicity of this presentation are absent from the literature.
- Subjects
EXPERT systems; ARTIFICIAL intelligence; LOGIC programming; KNOWLEDGE representation (Information theory); DEFAULT reasoning; NONMONOTONIC logic; DEDUCTIVE databases; FIRST-order logic
- Publication
Expert Systems, 2006, Vol 23, Issue 5, p342
- ISSN
0266-4720
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0394.2006.00415.x