We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem.
- Authors
Cownden, Daniel; Steinsaltz, David
- Abstract
In a novel multiplayer extension of the famous secretary problem, multiple players seek to employ secretaries from a common labour pool. Secretaries do not accept being put on hold, always accept job offers immediately, and leave the labour pool once rejected by a single player. All players have an identical preference for secretaries, and all players seek to optimize the probability of obtaining the best of all n secretaries. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, as the number, N, of players searching the labour pool grows, the optimal strategy converges to a simple function of N. For the two-player case we also compute how much players can gain through cooperation and how the optimal strategy changes under a payoff structure that promotes spite.
- Subjects
SECRETARY problem (Probability theory); OPTIMAL stopping (Mathematical statistics); FAMOUS problems in probabilities; GAME theory; NASH equilibrium
- Publication
Operations Research, 2014, Vol 62, Issue 1, p104
- ISSN
0030-364X
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1287/opre.2013.1233