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- Title
A general analysis of rent-seeking games.
- Authors
Pérez-Castrillo, J. David; Verdier, Thierry
- Abstract
In this paper we reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent seeking." We stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents.
- Subjects
MATHEMATICAL models; ECONOMIC equilibrium; PARADIGMS (Social sciences); THEORY; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Public Choice, 1992, Vol 73, Issue 3, p335
- ISSN
0048-5829
- Publication type
Article