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- Title
Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions.
- Authors
Shi, Fanqi; Xing, Yiqing
- Abstract
We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit‐demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all‐sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l‐th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions.
- Subjects
AUCTIONS; PRICES
- Publication
RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell), 2022, Vol 53, Issue 4, p703
- ISSN
0741-6261
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12423