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- Title
Reasons, intentions, and actions.
- Authors
Clarke, Randolph
- Abstract
Several theorists maintain that a consideration is a reason to ϕ (where ϕ-ing is an act-type) if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend to ϕ, and some hold as well that a consideration is a reason not to ϕ if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend not to ϕ. The claims often stem from views about what it is to be a practical reason. Here it is argued that both equivalence claims are false. Although no view of practical reasons is advanced, views that imply either equivalence claim are shown to be mistaken.
- Subjects
REASON; INTENTION; CONSIDERATION (Law); LEGAL claims; PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2024, Vol 181, Issue 6/7, p1589
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-024-02165-z