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- Title
A kockázatalapú bankszabályozás előretörése és visszaszorulása - az ösztönzési struktúrák szerepe.
- Authors
KATALIN, MÉRŐ
- Abstract
The approach to bank regulation has changed significantly since the global financial crisis (GFC), notably in a turn from risk-based to far less risk-sensitive regulation. Risk-based regulation allowing banks to use their internal risk management models for regulatory purposes was one of the main pre-GFC developments under the Basel II Accord. This approach to regulation assumed that banks were able to measure and manage their risk better than regulators. However, the GFC made it clear that the risk-based regulation greatly underestimates risks, primarily because of its poor incentive structures. So post-GFC regulation seemingly turned the clock back: the new Basel III regulation markedly reduced the scope for risk-based regulation, while strengthening the non-risk-sensitive character of regulation through several such regulatory tools. This turn is strongly contested, for it seems at first sight to be a step back towards an old, outdated regulatory system. The article analyses the emergence of risk-based regulation before the GFC and its decline after the crisis. Its main conclusion is that mixed risk-based and non-risk-sensitive systems are superior to either purely risk-based or purely non-risk-sensitive systems.
- Publication
Economic Review / Kozgazdasagi Szemle, 2018, Vol 65, p981
- ISSN
0023-4346
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.18414/KSZ.2018.10.981