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- Title
Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal.
- Authors
McAninch, Andrew
- Abstract
The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case (A) her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or (B) her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view maintains a link between activity, reason-responsiveness, and answerability, while avoiding commitments to an implausible theory of motivation.
- Subjects
PERSONALITY; ASSERTIONS (Logic); PHILOSOPHY; SUBMISSIVENESS; PASSIVITY (Psychology)
- Publication
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2017, Vol 98, Issue 1, p2
- ISSN
0279-0750
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/papq.12090