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- Title
How Requests Give Reasons: The Epistemic Account versus Schaber's Value Account.
- Authors
Weltman, Daniel
- Abstract
I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any new reasons but instead simply reveal information. For instance, my request that you X reveals that I desire that you X, and my desire gives you a reason to X. Peter Schaber has recently attacked both the epistemic account and other theories of the reason-giving force of requests. Schaber defends a new theory of the reason-giving force of requests according to which request give reasons because it is valuable for requesters and requestees that requests have this power. In this paper I argue that Schaber's attack on the epistemic account fails, and that his own theory ought to be rejected because it faces compelling objections.
- Subjects
NORMATIVITY (Ethics); NORM (Philosophy); REASON; RATIONALISM; OBJECTIVISM (Philosophy)
- Publication
Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, 2023, Vol 26, Issue 3, p397
- ISSN
1386-2820
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10677-022-10338-0