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- Title
Ethics and Fictive Imagining.
- Authors
COOKE, BRANDON
- Abstract
Sometimes it is wrong to imagine or take pleasure in imagining certain things, and likewise it is sometimes wrong to prompt these things. Some argue that certain fictive imaginings-imaginings of fictional states of affairs-are intrinsically wrong or that taking pleasure in certain fictive imaginings is wrong and so prompting either would also be wrong. These claims sometimes also serve as premises in arguments linking the ethical properties of a fiction to its artistic value. However, even if we grant that it might sometimes be wrong to imagine x or to take pleasure in imagining x, nothing follows about the ethical status of fictively imagining x, with or without pleasure. Prompting some fictive imagining is intrinsically wrong only when the fiction is a means to encourage for export from the fiction to the actual world some belief or attitude that it would be blameworthy to hold. The failure of arguments for the wrongness of certain fictive imaginings and their prompting lies in part in a failure to recognize that imagining x and fictively imagining x are distinct mental acts. This distinction blocks many arguments attempting to forge a link between a work's ethical properties and its artistic properties.
- Subjects
IMAGINATION; AESTHETICS -- Moral &; ethical aspects; LITERATURE &; morals; RIGHT &; wrong; ALTERNATE histories (Fiction); SMUTS, Aaron; MOORE, G. E., 1873-1958; GAUT, Berys; HAROLD, James; ETHICS
- Publication
Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism, 2014, Vol 72, Issue 3, p317
- ISSN
0021-8529
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/jaac.12091