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- Title
SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PLEA BARGAINING WITH COSTLY TRIALS AND BAYESIAN JURIES.
- Authors
Bjerk, David
- Abstract
This paper investigates optimal plea bargaining when trials are costly, defendant guilt is uncertain, and juries rationally respond to the plea bargaining policy employed. The model shows that when innocence rates among the arrested are low, it is optimal to offer all defendants pleas that are acceptable to guilty and innocent defendants. However, as the innocence rate becomes more significant, optimal plea policy switches to one in which plea offers are only acceptable to guilty defendants. However, even when optimal, the societal benefits to such separating policies are limited due to constraints on the frequency such offers can be made.
- Subjects
FREQUENCY (Linguistics); JURY; PLEA bargaining; DEFENDANTS; ECONOMIC policy
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2021, Vol 59, Issue 1, p263
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.12922