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- Title
Nozick, Prohibition, and No-Fault Motor Insurance.
- Authors
Handfield, Toby
- Abstract
No-fault insurance schemes involve prohibiting exercise of the natural rights of individuals to recover damages from those whose negligence causes them harm. Public debate about no-fault emphasises consequentialist benefits, and takes little account of the putative rights of individuals to recovery. I argue, however, that even on a relatively extreme rights-based conception of justice, such as Robert Nozick’s, it may be possible to justify a no-fault scheme. The argument proceeds by: (1) elucidating what compensation the Nozickian must offer in return for prohibiting an activity such as the private recovery of damages; and consequently (2) arguing that there is no prima facie reason to think that the compensation afforded by participation in a no-fault scheme would be any less adequate than that afforded by participation in a system of tort law
- Subjects
NO-fault automobile insurance; DAMAGES (Law); NEGLIGENCE; TORT liability of insurance companies; JUSTICE
- Publication
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2003, Vol 20, Issue 2, p201
- ISSN
0264-3758
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/1468-5930.00246