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- Title
Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals.
- Authors
Korpela, Ville
- Abstract
We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154-169, ) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems
- Subjects
HONESTY; RESOURCE allocation; BAYESIAN analysis; ECONOMIC equilibrium; SOCIAL choice
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2014, Vol 43, Issue 3, p647
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-014-0792-0