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- Title
When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
- Authors
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard
- Abstract
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2 $$\times $$2 games, and standard examples of Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
- Subjects
GAME theory; IMITATION in business; ECONOMIC decision making; DUOPOLIES; NASH equilibrium; ECONOMIC competition; PUBLIC goods; COORDINATION games (Mathematics)
- Publication
International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, Vol 43, Issue 1, p25
- ISSN
0020-7276
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1