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- Title
CONSTANT SCORING RULES FOR CHOOSING ONE MANY ALTERNATIVES.
- Authors
Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.
- Abstract
The article comments on constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives. A group of decision makers is to choose one alternative from a finite set of three or more decision alternatives. Although the choice can be made in many different ways, people shall focus on selection by voting. Three generic procedures for generating profiles will be identified by the terms impartial culture, impartial anonymous culture and maximal culture. When a group is to select a decision alternative from a finite set of m > 3 feasible alternatives, it is often desirable to choose the social philosopher Marquis de Condorcet alternative when there is one. This study compared Condorcet efficiencies for constant voting rules Ck, where Ck has each member of the group vote for his k most preferred alternatives. Three different probabilistic procedures for generating voter preference profiles were discussed. Previous results, based largely on simulation data, were summarized, and new analytical results that corroborated previous findings were proved.
- Subjects
DECISION making; SOCIAL theory; VOTING; CONDORCET, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de, 1743-1794; PROBABILITY theory; GUIDELINES
- Publication
Quality & Quantity, 1981, Vol 15, Issue 2, p203
- ISSN
0033-5177
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF00144260