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- Title
Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.
- Authors
Green, Derek
- Abstract
Mental content normativists hold that the mind's conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think that facts of the form "subject S possesses concept c" imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of c in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S's possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence, these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the "Source Objection." This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
- Subjects
PERSONAL property; CONCEPTS
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2021, Vol 36, Issue 2, p159
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-020-00436-y