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- Title
Large Tullock contests.
- Authors
Doğan, Serhat; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Sağlam, Çağrı
- Abstract
We characterize the equilibrium effort function of a large Tullock contest game with heterogeneous agents under mild conditions on the contest success function and effort cost function. Later, writing the equilibrium total effort explicitly under a uniform type distribution, we identify the effort-maximizing large Tullock contest. It is shown that the contest designer needs to increase the curvature of the effective effort function, thereby encouraging high-type agents to exert even higher efforts, as the curvature of the effort cost function increases or the support of the type distribution gets narrower.
- Subjects
COST functions; CONTESTS
- Publication
Journal of Economics, 2023, Vol 140, Issue 2, p169
- ISSN
0931-8658
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00712-023-00829-8