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- Title
Kantian Freedom as "Purposiveness".
- Authors
Wright, Ava Thomas
- Abstract
Arthur Ripstein's conception of Kantian freedom has exerted an enormous recent influence on scholars of Kant's political philosophy; however, the conception seems to me flawed. In this paper, I argue that Ripstein's conception of Kantian freedom as "your capacity to choose the ends you will use your means to pursue" – your "purposiveness" – is both too narrow and too broad: (1) Wrongful acts such as coercive threats cannot choose my ends for me; instead, such acts wrongfully restrict my perceived options. And (2) rightful changes to the context in which I choose that render my means insufficient for my ends restrict my capacity to choose them. Alternatively, my purposiveness reduces to my entitlements; but then freedom as purposiveness is viciously circular or fails as a new approach to the "devastating" objection that motivates it.
- Subjects
KANT, Immanuel, 1724-1804; POLITICAL philosophy; LIBERTY; TORTS
- Publication
Kant-Studien, 2022, Vol 113, Issue 4, p640
- ISSN
0022-8877
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1515/kant-2022-2039