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- Title
Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach.
- Authors
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Majumdar, Mukul; Radner, Roy
- Abstract
The paper explores a game-theoretic model of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur, but its distribution is common knowledge. Each bureaucrat clears the project only if a bribe is paid. The bribe for qualified projects (“extortion”) and unqualified projects (“capture”) may differ. We identify the nature and welfare implications of different types of equilibria under appropriate technical assumptions on the structure of the game.
- Subjects
GAME theory; BUSINESSPEOPLE; CORRUPTION; CIVIL service; BUSINESSMEN
- Publication
International Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, Vol 4, Issue 2, p273
- ISSN
1742-7355
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1742-7363.2008.00078.x