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- Title
The Concept of Manas in Jaina Philosophy.
- Authors
Soni, Jayandra
- Abstract
The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala (TAS 1, 9). These are the pramāṇas (TAS 1, 10). In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda's commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya and śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition (buddhīndriya) and an organ of action (karmendriya, SK 27). It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system.
- Subjects
MANAS (Indic philosophy); JAINA philosophy; SENSORY perception; COGNITION; THEORY of knowledge
- Publication
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2020, Vol 48, Issue 2, p315
- ISSN
0022-1791
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10781-020-09421-6