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- Title
The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules.
- Authors
Karmokar, Madhuparna; Roy, Souvik
- Abstract
We explore the structure of locally ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (LOBIC) random Bayesian rules (RBRs). We show that under lower contour monotonicity, for almost all prior profiles (with full Lebesgue measure), a LOBIC RBR is locally dominant strategy incentive compatible (LDSIC). We further show that for almost all prior profiles, a unanimous and LOBIC RBR on the unrestricted domain is random dictatorial, and thereby extend the result in Gibbard (Econometrica 45:665–681, 1977) for Bayesian rules. Next, we provide a sufficient condition on a domain so that for almost all prior profiles, unanimous RBRs on it are tops-only. Finally, we provide a wide range of applications of our results on single-peaked (on arbitrary graphs), hybrid, multiple single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing, multi-dimensional separable domains, and domains under partitioning. Since OBIC implies LOBIC by definition, all our results hold for OBIC RBRs.
- Subjects
INCENTIVE (Psychology); LEBESGUE measure; SOCIAL choice; SOCIAL skills
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2023, Vol 76, Issue 1, p111
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-022-01449-x